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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper extends the literature on the investment decision-making of business angels.  Using 
insights from entrepreneurial learning theory we explore whether angels learn from experience, 
how they learn and what they learn. These issues are addressed using Verbal Protocol Analysis, a 
methodology for examining decision-making in real time, on three groups of business angels with 
differing levels of investment experience, and follow-up interviews with these angels. This reveals 
some differences in the speed of decision making and the emphasis given to various investment 
criteria. The relatively limited extent of the contrasts can be attributed to two factors. First, angel 
learning has been in terms of their approach to investing rather than fundamentals.  Second, this 
learning has had more effect on how they conduct their due diligence on opportunities that pass 
their initial screening than on the initial screening stage itself. Learning from other investors is 
important. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There is now a small but significant literature on how business angels make their investment 
decisions (see Mason, 2006: Riding et al, 2007 for reviews).  These studies are of three types. The 
first type is process studies.  Riding et al. (1993) and Haines et al. (2003) have identified a number 
of discrete stages in their investment decision, similar to that used by venture capital funds (Fried 
and Hisrich, 1994), comprising: deal origination, deal evaluation – which can be divided into 
initial screening and detailed investigation, negotiation and contracting, post-investment 
involvement and exiting. The second type are criteria studies which examine the criteria which 
angels use to evaluate investment opportunities. This category can be further divided into three 
sub-categories. One sub-category of studies provides a generalized retrospective view of angels’ 
investment criteria with responses normally gathered through postal surveys commonly use (e.g. 
Mason and Harrison, 1994; 2002). The limitations of this approach are that they do not distinguish 
between the type of investment opportunity or between factors used at the screening stage and the 
detailed evaluation stage. Post-hoc rationalisation is also problematic. Another sub-category is 
case studies of how individual investors or specific angel groups make their investment decisions. 
For example, Mason and Harrison (1996) examined deals rejected by a UK business angel 
investment group. The third sub-category is real time studies which have emerged in response to 
the weaknesses in the generalized retrospective approach. Mason and Rogers (1996; 1997) used 
verbal protocol analysis – essentially asking respondents to ‘think out loud’ as they perform a task, 
in this case undertaking the initial screening of an investment opportunity. Others have used 
conjoint analysis – an analytical tool primarily used in marketing, to study factors that influence 
purchasing decisions based which is based on asking respondents to make a series of  trade-offs  
(e.g. Landström, 1998; Ludvigsen, 2009). A variant on these verbal protocol studies are studies 
which have examined the real time reactions of investors to oral presentations by entrepreneurs 
(Mason and Harrison, 2003; Clark, 2008). Finally, some studies have sought, using various 
methodologies, to compare the investment decision-making processes and investment criteria of 
business angels and other types of investor (e.g. Mason and Stark, 2004).  
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A major gap in this literature on angel investing is the effect of experience on investment 
decision-making. Indeed, previous studies implicitly assume angel investors know what they are 
doing and that their approach to investing does not change with experience. As a first contribution 
to addressing this omission we apply insights from the entrepreneurial learning literature to 
explore the process of learning in angel investing. The paper has three objectives. First, we address 
the following questions.  Do angel investors learn from experience?  If so, how do they learn? And 
how does this learning influence their approach to investing? Second, we discuss the extent to 
which angels, whether experienced or novice, use heuristics as the basis for vicarious learning 
from the experience of others. Third, we ask how investors without prior investment experience 
learn.  Many angels make only a small number of investments and this may not be sufficient to 
derive the necessary experience to improve their investment ability. Reflecting on March et al.’s 
(2003) analysis of learning from samples of less than one we explore how inexperienced angels 
(with one or fewer investments) learn from experience and convert infrequent events into 
interpretations that form the basis interpreting subsequent knowledge-shaping experiences. 
Evidence on these issues has the potential to make a valuable contribution to angel education. 
 
Entrepreneurial action is predicated on learning, and in recent years there have been a number 
of models developed to account for how entrepreneurs learn (Harrison and Leitch 2005, 2008).  
These variously emphasise learning through the accumulation of experiential knowledge (Politis 
2005; Cope 2005), the role of learning asymmetries that offer opportunity exploitation advantages 
(Corbett 2005, 2007; Rae and Carswell 2001) and the accumulation, assimilation and use of 
entrepreneurial knowledge (Wang 2008; Levesque et al 2009).  Much of this research is based, 
directly or indirectly, on adaptations of Kolb’s (1984) experiential learning theory, which sees 
learning as a cyclical process of learning from experience through reflection and conceptualisation 
to action and thence on to further experience (Kayes 2002). 
 
Two developments in the learning and decision-making literatures provide the basis for our 
discussion in this paper.  First, we acknowledge that while learning is an individual phenomenon 
acquired experientially, there is a significant role played by vicarious learning from the experience 
of others.  Second, and related to this, recent attention has been directed to the importance of 
heuristics and their influence on entrepreneurial learning (Holcomb et al 2009) when there is 
uncertainty about the nature of information and/or about the conditions that enable or hinder 
certain outcomes.  If investors learn from experience – that is, they tend to choose actions in the 
future that parallel successful actions in the past (Politis 2005) – then we need to understand the 
nature of the imprinting impact of these past behaviours.  The role of past experience, how it is 
acquired and the impact of this on the learning process is, therefore, a major focus of research 
attention. 
 
HOW BUSINESS ANGELS EVALUATE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Previous business angel studies have provided some level of insight into how they evaluate 
investment opportunities. When they first become aware of an investment opportunity their first 
question is to consider how well it ‘fits’ with their own personal investment criteria. This may 
include location, amount sought, knowledge of an interest in the sector and ability to add value. 
Angels then undertake a quick review of those opportunities which fall within their personal 
investment criteria. Their aim at this point in the decision-making process is simply to assess 
whether the proposal has sufficient merit to justify the investment of time to undertake a detailed 
assessment. Mason and Rogers (1996; 1997) observe that angels approach this stage with a 
negative mindset, expecting that the opportunity will be poor (because of the opportunities that 
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 they have previously seen) and looking for reasons to reject it. This approach has been termed 
‘three strikes and you’re out’ (Mason and Rogers, 1996; 1997) and is supported by evidence that 
the rejection of opportunities is generally based on several factors rather than a single deal killer 
(Mason and Harrison, 1996). The market and the entrepreneur are the key considerations at this 
stage. Less significant are the product/service and financial factors. Indeed, angels exhibit 
considerable scepticism about the value of financial information in the business plan of start-ups. 
Nevertheless, investors want to see that there is the potential for significant financial return, that 
the principals are financially committed and what the money that is invested will be used for. 
Some angels will be flexible, willing to treat these criteria as compensatory (e.g. a strong 
management team would compensate for a distant location), whereas others will regard them as 
non-compensatory (Feeney et al, 1999).   
 
The purpose of the initial screen is to filter out ‘no hopers’ in order to focus their time on those 
opportunities that appear to have potential. These are subject to more detailed appraisal. The 
investor will read the business plan in detail, go over the financial information, visit the premises, 
do some personal research to gather additional information on market potential, competition and 
so on, and assess the principals. Indeed, getting to know the principals personally (by a series of 
formal and informal meetings) is the most vital part of the process (May and Simmons, 2001). 
This stage has received little attention from researchers. According to May and Simmons (2001: 
101) “it might consist of a few phone calls and a visit or two, or weeks of meetings, documents 
flying back and forth and questions, questions, questions.” However, it would appear that most 
angels emphasise their intuition and gut feeling rather than performing formal analysis (Haines et 
al, 2003. At this detailed evaluation stage the importance of people factors becomes critical 
(Riding et al, 1995), with investors emphasising management abilities, an understanding of what is 
required to be successful, a strong work ethic, integrity, honesty, openness and personal chemistry 
(Haines et al, 2003; Mason and Stark, 2004). Indeed, angels give greater emphasis to these issues 
than venture capital fund managers (Mason and Stark, 2004). This emphasis on the people reflects 
the long and personal nature of the angel-entrepreneur relationship. Rewards, realism of the 
projections and potential also assume greater importance while ‘investor fit’ becomes less of a 
consideration (Riding et al, 1995).  
 
Angels typically reject most of the opportunities that they see. In their Canadian study Riding 
et al (1993) found that 72.6% of opportunities were rejected at the initial impressions stage, a 
further 15.9% were rejected following more detailed evaluation, and as this stage proceeds another 
6.3% were eliminated, a cumulative rejection rate of 94.8%. Thus, business angels proceed to the 
negotiation stage with only 5% of the investment opportunities that they receive. 
 
In the remainder of this paper we seek to extend this literature on investment decision-making 
by business angels by exploring whether business angles learn from experience, how they learn 
and how this learning is reflected in their approach to investing. We do so, first, by comparing 
how investors with differing levels of investment experience approach the appraisal of investment 
opportunities, and second, by asking investors to reflect on their learning. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This paper uses verbal protocol analysis, a technique which involves respondents ‘thinking out 
loud’ as they perform a particular task, in this case reviewing a potential funding opportunity. The 
technique has been used successfully to examine the decision-making process of both venture 
capitalists and business angels (Hall and Hofer, 1993; Zacharakis and Meyer, 1995; Mason and 
Rogers, 1996; 1997; Mason and Stark, 2004) and has also been applied in a variety of other 
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 contexts (see Ericsson and Simon, 1993). The verbalisations of respondents are recorded, 
transcribed and then content analysed by means of a coding scheme devised for the specific 
research questions.  
 
This methodology provides a more reliable and much richer understanding of the decision-
making process of investor and the criteria used to evaluate investment opportunities than is 
possible from approaches that use questionnaires, surveys and interviews (Shepherd and 
Zacharakis, 1999). Self-reported, retrospective data are subject to conscious or unconscious errors 
associated with post hoc rationalisation and recall bias. There are also cognitive perceptual 
limitations, with evidence that venture capitalists have limited insights into their decision-
processes (Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998; Shepherd, 1999). The consequence is that they often 
overstate the number of criteria actually used, understate the most important criteria and overstate 
the least important criteria (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999). Hence, as Zacharakis and Meyer 
(1998: 72) note, “‘past studies provide a laundry list of factors that may be biased in that they list a 
multitude of factors that have a relatively small influence on the decision.” As a real-time 
experiment which does not require investors to introspect about their thought processes, verbal 
protocol analysis sidesteps these recall, post hoc rationalisation and cognitive biases (Shepherd 
and Zacharakis, 1999). 
 
Moreover, as noted above, the evaluation of investment opportunities is a multi-stage process. 
Although the same considerations may be present at each stage their relative importance changes 
during the course of the decision-making process (Riding et al, 1993). A further limitation of 
questionnaire and interview surveys of decision-making is that they do not differentiate between 
these different stages in the decision-making process and as a consequence may produce 
misleading findings.  
 
The focus is on the initial screening stage – the stage when a funder has become aware of an 
investment opportunity and considers it with a view to obtaining sufficient initial impressions to 
decide whether it is worthy of detailed consideration or should be rejected out of hand. This stage 
is done fairly quickly, typically in under 10 minutes (Sweeting, 1991; Hall and Hofer, 1993; 
Mason and Rogers, 1996; 1997), with angels rejecting most of the opportunities that they review. 
One study of Canadian business angels reported that they accepted just 6% of the investment 
opportunities for detailed consideration (Haines at al., 2003). 
 
Nevertheless, verbal protocol analysis has some limitations. First, a frequency count of 
‘thought units’ is an imperfect indicator of the importance of a factor in the final decision 
(Zacharakis and Meyer, 1995). No weightings are placed on the responses to measure emphasis 
and the topics mentioned most frequently are not necessarily those that have the ultimate influence 
on the decision. Nor does it allow for different convincer patterns. In other words, people may 
repeat something several times it they are unsure but say it only once if they are absolutely sure. 
Second, subjectivity is involved in coding, analysing and interpreting the transcripts (Riquelme 
and Rickards, 1992). Third, some respondents may be uncomfortable or self-conscious about 
thinking and speaking out loud which may distort their thinking (e.g. resulting in excessive 
repetition of what they are reading). Fourth, it is impossible to entirely remove the effect of the 
artificiality of the situation. Fifth, from a practical point of view it ignores the role of the source of 
funding opportunity which is an important initial influence on the investor’s attitude to the 
opportunity (Hall and Hofer, 1993). However, Ericsson and Simon (1980) argue that verbal 
protocol analysis is a valuable method of analysing decision-making as long as the following 
criteria are met: 
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 • The information reported must be the focus of attention 
 
• The task is not highly routinised by habit 
 
• There must be only a short time between performance and verbalisation 
 
• Verbalisation does not require excessive encoding 
 
• Reports are oral 
 
• Subjects are free from distraction 
 
• Instructions are clear 
 
• Completeness in reporting is encouraged 
 
These conditions are all met in this study. 
 
The sample comprised three groups with contrasting investment experience, each comprising 
four angels, all based in Scotland, who were all identified with the help of LINC Scotland, the 
national association for business angels. The first group comprised experienced (or super) business 
angels who had each made five or more investments. The second group comprised novice angels 
who had each made just one investment. The final group comprised nascent angels who were 
seriously engaged in looking to make their first investment. The terminologies were taken from 
Paul et al (2003). Each angel was shown a current real investment opportunity which was sourced 
from a business angel network. It was given a fictitious name to protect its anonymity and it was 
given a local address in view of the importance that the majority of angels give to investing in 
local businesses (Mason, 2007). This was a start-up health care/medical devices company seeking 
£500,000 ($750,000) in a seed finance round. The angels were asked to read the opportunity in the 
same way that they would normally read an investment proposal but verbalise their thoughts as 
they did so. The instruction that they were given was to say out loud the thoughts that came into 
their mind. Respondents were not required to provide any explanations or verbal descriptions 
(Ericsson and Simon, 1993). The lead author was present as each respondent performed this task 
and reminded respondents to think out loud if they lapsed into silence for more than 15 seconds. 
The locations were either the angel’s home office, work office or a hotel. 
 
Their thoughts were recorded and subsequently a complete transcript was made for each 
respondent’s consideration of each investment opportunity. A short de-briefing session was 
carried out with each investor after they had completed the evaluation which asked them to reflect 
on their own learning as investors. In the case of nascent angels the discussion revolved around 
what they recognized they did not know and needed to learn. Following the approach of Mason 
and Rogers (1996; 1997) these verbatim transcripts were then broken down into short phrases, or 
‘thought segments’ – that is, phrases and sentences that are independent thought units – to permit 
analysis. These thought units were then coded first into one of nine categories relating to different 
types of investment criteria and secondly into seven categories of cognitive process (e.g. 
description, inference, question). The frequency counts for each category of investor were then 
aggregated and compared. Our expectation was that we would be able to observe differences 
between the three groups angels in terms of how they went about the investment screening, that 
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 the differences could be ascribed to learning from experience and we could interpret the nature of 
this learning using the learning theories discussed earlier. 
 
RESULTS 
 
There was no difference between the investor groups in terms of the investment decision. 
Three of the four angels in each category rejected the opportunity outright, with only one in each 
group sufficiently interested to want more information and meet the entrepreneur (Table 1).  
 
The time taken to make the decision ranged from just under four minutes to just over 20 
minutes (Table 1), although as Mason and Rogers (1997) previously noted, there is a strong sense 
that because of the artificiality of the situation angels went on reading the proposal for longer than 
they would in normal circumstances. Super angels made the quickest decision and exhibited the 
least variability. They were nearly two minutes quicker than nascent angels and nearly two-and-a-
half minutes faster than novice angels who were the slowest group to make a decision. It seems 
reasonable to interpret the quicker decision time of the super angels in terms of their greater 
experience which enables them to ‘cut to the chase’, suggesting evidence of experiential learning 
and faster cognitive processes (Baron and Ensley, 2006). 
 
Three observations can be made concerning the investment criteria used by these different 
types of angels (Table 2). First, there is broad agreement amongst the different types of business 
angels in the relative importance of the funding criteria. The rankings are similar, with a maximum 
difference of three places. There is an overlap between two of the top three investment criteria 
between nascents and novices (product and finance) and between novices and experienced angels 
(product and investment fit). However, there is only one investment criterion common to nascents 
and experienced angels (product). Finance is the most important criterion for both nascent and 
novice angels but only 4th for experienced investors. This is consistent with previous research 
which notes that experienced angels do not place much emphasis on finances and are fairly cynical 
about the value of projections (Mason and Rogers, 1997). Investor fit is the most important 
criterion amongst experienced angels, second amongst novice angels but only 4th amongst nascent 
angels. Experienced angels clearly recognise the value of maintaining clear investment criteria and 
not deviating from them, by investing in businesses in markets and sectors that they know and 
understand. The other significant deviations relate to marketing with nascents placing more 
emphasis than either novices or experienced angels ranked 3rd, 6th and 5th respectively), and the 
business plan which experienced angels emphasise more than either novices or nascents (3rd, 4th 
and 6th respectively).  
 
Second, there is a higher degree of agreement amongst those factors that are of lesser 
importance – operations is 9th ranked for all three investor types, other is ranked 7th or 8th and the 
entrepreneur is ranked 7th by both nascent and experienced angels but 5th by novices. 
 
Third, there are contrasts in the way in which the different investor types allocate their time. 
Nascent investors spend almost one-third of their time on their top ranked investment criterion 
compared with 22.3% of their time for nascents and 20.1% of their time for experienced angels. 
This difference widens further when their 2nd top investment factor is added (53.7%, 42.9% and 
39.6%) and although the gap narrows after that it remains clearly identifiable until the fifth 
investment criteria. This suggests that experienced angels do not become obsessed with just one or 
two investment factors. 
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 There are few differences in the cognitive processes used by business angels to analyse the 
investment proposal. Inferences, questions and descriptions are the top three statement types for 
all three groups of angels with question and description ranked 2nd and 3rd for nascent angels but 
reserved for novice and experienced angels. In terms of their allocation of time nascent angels 
spend most time asking questions (26.2% cf. 15.1% and 20.1% for novice and experienced angels 
respectively) and least time on description (16.7% cf. 19.9% and 22.7% respectively). 
 
These contrasts in the verbal frequency counts amongst the three groups of angels are not as 
great as might be expected, with the differences limited to the time to make the decision and the 
emphasis given to certain investment criteria. This may suggest that the extent of learning has 
been limited. However, this not the case. In follow-up questions after completing the verbal 
protocols the super angels all acknowledge that they have learnt continuously. “You are always 
learning … It’s been a process of personal evolution” (super 2). “I learn from every investment I 
have made” (super 1). Learning begins with the very first investment. One super angel commented 
as follows: “After the first investment I thought, hang on a minute, I really need to be more 
diligent in the questions and actually test what people are saying to me in a more robust way” 
(Super 4). The novice angels similarly also noted that they gained significant learning from their 
initial investment.  
 
Instead, we attribute the relatively limited contrasts in the verbal protocol frequency to two 
other factors. First, the impact of much of the learning appears to be reflected in the next stage of 
the investment process, where angels undertake a detailed investigation of those investment 
proposals that pass their initial screen, rather than at the initial screening stage itself. Second, it 
reflects the nature of the learning which appears to be restricted, with the majority of super and 
novice angels noting that the underlying fundamentals (i.e. the key investment criteria) and their 
investment processes have remained the same. This apparent contradiction is explained in the 
following terms by one novice angel: “I don’t think it’s so much learning but reinforcement, like 
people skills being really important” (novice 1). Another commented that investing is “definitely a 
practical learning experience … [but] it doesn’t change your underlying approach” (novice 2). The 
same point is made by this angel: “Has my approach to investing changed? Not really. I think it all 
comes down to the four things I look for – people, profit, cash generation and exit. So 
fundamentally no it’s not really changed … how I actually produce the question sets has changed 
but fundamentally these four elements are the most important elements for me” (super 4). And 
another commented: “I think I still do what I did before … what’s at the core of this … [business] 
…. [But] I don’t necessarily accept all the stuff that’s all around it.” In other words, learning 
appears to have primarily influenced the approach of business angels and shaped the emphasis that 
they give to particular investment criteria (super 3). 
 
The types of learning cited by the angels supports this interpretation. By far the most 
commonly cited learning (amongst six of the eight novice and super angels) concerned changes to 
the way in which they assess the people involved in the business. The following comments were 
made by super angels: 
 
“I was willing to believe peoples’ honesty and integrity without necessarily testing it. 
Something I do differently now is quiz people a hell of a lot more… I certainly do things 
differently now than when I made my first investment” (super 4). 
“Assuming that because people are a specialist in their own field they actually know 
anything was part of the naivety and learning curve that I went through. I actually thought 
that people , if they were specialists in that area, knew what they were actually talking 
about. And that isn’t necessarily the case” (super 4). 
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  “On the assume nothing principle, I am much more careful about understanding what the 
words in a plan mean and what the writers of the plan mean. When I meet entrepreneurs I 
am much more interested in their definitions and checking out what they mean” (super 3).  
 
Novice angels made similar observations. 
 
“I am learning that we are backing people  … so I would be much more critical. I would go 
into much greater detail on the capability of the people and I would try to get more 
involved” (novice 3) 
“I would hope to concentrate more on people than spread sheets” (novice 2) 
“What I am now looking at is the people – who are the people, what are their skills what is 
their background is what I am looking at to give me a sense of comfort. Do the people 
really know what they are talking about?” (novice 1)  
 
The other area of learning that several angels identified was associated with the need to focus 
and discriminate and thereby make quicker decisions. 
 
 “When I first started looking a propositions …. Everything that came my way I’d spend 
time looking at it. I might spend time subsequently meeting with the individuals. There is a 
hell of a lot of stuff I did in those days that now wouldn’t get past the first couple of pages 
… So there has got to be something that jumps out in the proposition” (super 2). 
“I feel far more confident about making quick decisions about investments … [With greater 
experience] you can very quickly decide to go to the next stage and want to meet these 
people or don’t want to meet them …So it won’t take me three or four months to make up 
my mind if I am going to invest or not.”(novice 1) 
 
Finally, two angels said that they now rely more on their instinct and gut feeling. “When I first 
started I was always looking for the good points in a proposition. Now I follow my hunch, my gut 
feeling and disregard more” (super 2). “I make my investments predominantly on a sixth sense” 
(super 4). 
 
Several of the angels identified other investors as a key source of their learning. One novice 
angel noted that “you get involved in more syndicates, looking at attending meetings and just 
picking up from different people when you go to these meetings in terms of what they are looking 
at” (Novice 1). He went on to say that “you get to the stage where you have people that you 
respect and take opinion from who you listen to their views who are far more experienced than 
me”. A super angel who was quoted earlier saying that “you are always learning” went on to 
highlight the importance of “one particular individual that I met about a year and a half ago. He 
and I have various involvements together so we use each other as a sounding board … Initially I 
was looking at projects in relative isolation and making decisions myself. Now I bring in someone 
else for a second opinion. So if I look at a proposition and think it is good I bring in another 
person to rip the proposition apart for me to see if I have missed anything. So that is how I operate 
now but it’s not how I operated 18 months or two years ago.” (super 2).  
 
Learning was also precipitated by a ‘learning event’ (Cope, 2003), with a recurring theme 
being learning from failed investments. One angel commented as follows; “We had one 
investment go down, all because the founder was not right. All through the process we were 
making excuses for him. I am now very aware of not making excuses for people now. It was a 
harsh lesson that we needed to learn and it has made us better investors as a result” (super 3). 
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 Another investor now invests smaller amounts across a larger number of businesses as a result of a 
previous failed investment. 
 
Nascent angels, on the other hand, fell into two groups. Two nascents were confident – 
arguably over-confident - that the knowledge that they had derived from their professional career 
meant that there was little if anything that they needed to learn. One commented that “I think I 
know enough to be able to make informed judgements on businesses as I have spent a whole 
career doing it” (Nascent 1). The other commented in similar vein: “I led a management buyout in 
2001 and I’m pretty conditioned to reviewing investment proposals because for years I’ve done 
due diligence on investments and I have actively been involved in my professional life in various 
strategic initiatives such as acquisitions, disposals and so on. So the thought process is something I 
am used to conversing with” (nascent 3). In contrast, the two other nascent angels recognised their 
need to learn, and indicated that they were looking to learn from existing investors. One 
commented that “I could produce a due diligence document and go through all the questions that 
would satisfy but I’m quite sure an experienced angel would look for other things” (nascent 4). 
The other – a former banker – recognised that his banking background did not give him the full 
toolkit to become an angel investor. He willingly acknowledged that “there is a lot I don’t know. 
Unconscious incompetence probably sums it up” (nascent 2), adding that he was coming to angel 
investing “very much with a banker’s head on.” This raises the possibility that nascent angels may 
have to unlearn some of their previous experience before they can start to learn how to be an 
effective investor. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has sought to extend the literature on how business angels make their investment 
decision by exploring the effect that experience has on their approach. Given the weaknesses of 
retrospective analyses of decision-making our approach was based on a real time methodology, 
verbal protocol analysis, which involved asking three groups of angels, differentiated by their 
investment experience, to review an investment opportunity. The three groups were compared in 
terms of speed of decision, investment criteria and cognitive processes. Super angels – the most 
experienced - were quickest to make their decision and their review gave greater emphasis to 
‘investor fit’ than either the novice or the nascent angels. These angels, in contrast, gave more 
emphasis than super angels to financial issues. The only difference of note in the cognitive 
processes was that nascent angels spent more time than either novice or super angels in asking 
(rhetorical) questions as they read the proposal. 
 
Both the super and novice angels recognised that they have learnt continuously from their 
investment experience. However, the learning has been in terms of their approach to investing 
rather than their fundamental investment philosophy. Moreover, this learning has had more effect 
on how they conduct their due diligence on opportunities that pass their initial screening rather 
than on the initial screening stage itself, with the key learning based around the way in which they 
assess the people involved in the business. Some have also learnt how to discriminate more 
effectively and hence make quicker decisions. Investing with other, more experienced, angels has 
been a significant source of learning for the majority of novice and nascent angels. Failed 
investments have also been a significant source of learning. The attitudes of some of the nascent 
entrepreneurs, on the other hand, seemed complacent, believing that they could rely on knowledge 
that they had accumulated in their professional career. 
 
Finally, the paper confirms the importance of the social dimension of learning for several of 
the business angels. These angels note that learning from other, more experienced angels, both 
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 members of the same investment syndicate and investment partners, have been a significant source 
of learning. 
 
CONTACT: Colin M Mason; colin.mason@strath.ac.uk; (T): +44 141 548 4259; (F): +44 141 
552 7602; Hunter Centre for Entrepreneurship, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow G1 1XH, 
Scotland, United Kingdom.  
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 Table 1.  Decision and Length of Time to Make Decision 
 Nascent Angels Novice Angels Super Angels 
 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
 
Decision 
 
x 
 
√ 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
√ 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
√ 
Time 
Taken 
 
6m 
55s 
 
14m 
25s 
 
9m 
40s 
 
3m 
55s 
 
20m 
53s 
 
5m 
20s 
 
6m 
30s 
 
11m 
15s 
 
11m 
50s 
 
5m 
30s 
 
6m 
25s 
 
6m 
30s 
 
Average 
Time  
 
8m 44s 
(Median 8m 18s) 
 
10m 59s 
(Median 8m53s) 
 
7m 34s 
(Median 6m28s) 
Key: x = reject : √ = consider in more detail 
Table 2. Verbal Protocol Frequency Counts by Funding Criterion 
Funding Criterion % of thought units by type - averaged by type of Business Angel (figure in 
brackets is ranking) 
 Nascent Business Angel Novice Business Angel Super Business 
Angel 
Entrepreneur 4.4 (7) 8.7  (5) 11  (7) 
Strategy 6.5 (5) 5.3  (7) 2.6  (6) 
Operations 0.3 (9) 0  (9) 1  (9) 
Product 21.4 (2) 18  (3) 19.5  (2) 
Market 15.3 (3) 7.2  (6) 12.7  (5) 
Finance 32.3 (1) 22.3  (1) 14  (4) 
Investor Fit 8.8 (4) 20.6  (2) 20.1  (1) 
Business Plan 6.5 (6) 14.9  (4) 17.2  (3) 
Other 4.4 (7) 2.9  (8) 1.9  (8) 
Total 100 100 100 
Notes: Percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding 
Table 3. Verbal Protocol Frequency Counts by Statement Type 
Statement Type % of thought units by type - averaged by type of Business Angel 
(figure in brackets is ranking) 
 Nascent Business 
Angel 
Novice 
Business Angel 
Super 
Business Angel 
Description 16.7 (3) 19.9  (2) 22.7  (2) 
Recall 4.8 (5) 1.8  (7) 3.6  (6) 
Preconception 4.8 (5) 6.3  (6) 5.2  (5) 
Inference 38.1 (1) 38.1  (1) 37.7  (1) 
Question 26.2 (2) 15.1  (3) 20.1  (3) 
Action 2 (7) 8.5  (5) 3.2  (7) 
Comment 7.5 (4) 10.3  (4) 7.5  (4) 
Total 100 100 100 
Notes: Percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding 
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